

Committee: Security Council

Issue: The Situation in Somalia

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Position: Deputy President

Important note from the chairs' team

In order for the chairs to fully understand the dynamics of the committee, discovering any misunderstanding prior to the debate and for the better preparation of the delegates you are asked to proceed as indicated below; 1) Conduct your chairs via email and informing them about your mun experience so that they can know what exactly to expect of you.

2) Prepare and send your chairs by 11:59 of the 6th of November one position papers for each of the topics you are going to discuss during the conference. You can contact the expert chair of each topic for further information concerning your country's policy if needed, and for general guidance when it comes to your position papers (word limit structure etc). You are going to receive general comments during the lobbying for your position papers as well as personal feedback and grades for your papers. The points you will receive will add up to your general score which is one of the factors that determine the best delegate award. If you for any reason fail to send your papers before the final deadline you will not be eligible for any award.

Find your expert chair for this topic at mayavasilaki@gmail.com .

INTRODUCTION

Somalia is a country located in the Horn of Africa (Northeastern African peninsula). It is a homogenous nation, which is divided in clans. Somalia was colonized by multiple European countries since the 17th century, with Italy and Britain holding the most Somali land for the longest time. In 1960, Somalia declared its independence. Only 9 years later (1969) Muhammad Siad Barre rose to power, initiating a long lasting dictatorship. In 1970 he proceeded to declare Somalia a socialist country and nationalized the economy.

In 1991, Siad Barre is ousted. Warlords and terrorist groups fight over land and foreign forces trying to contain the situation and establish a lawful government. Groups who aim to enforce the laws and ideals of Islam on the citizens of Somalia have seized power in parts of the country, receiving help from known terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda. The situation has been partially contained in parts of the country, but political instability has not ceased to exist in the last 28 years. The United Nations have made multiple efforts to establish a lawful government and stop the aforementioned groups, but none of those efforts has been completely successful. The United States of America have taken a particular interest in the situation in Somalia. Because a number of locations in the country are under the control of local terrorist organizations, Somalia is a safe place for foreign terrorists to hide, and recruit new members. Contributing to the situation is the fact that Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab has pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda, which happens to be one of USA's biggest targets.

The ongoing conflict in combination with a long lasting drought and the death of over 80% of the country's livestock has brought famine upon Somali people. The prices of food are constantly rising and any attempt to send food in the country will go to waste, seeing as the supplies will end up in the hands of the soldiers and not those of the people in need.



The long lasting drought has caused thousands of Somalis to starve

Since 2005, Somali rebels and terrorist groups have been cooperating with pirates, who sail in international waters and seize foreign commercial ships. They go on to sail the stolen ships to Somali coast and ask ransom for the goods the ships carry. Somali piracy is contributing to the rise of terrorism in the country, seeing as terrorist groups are often funded by ally pirates.

In February 2017, Somalia held its first election after the 1969 dictatorship. Mohamed Abdullahi "Farmajo" Mohamed was elected president, and has promised to bring Somalia stability and fight corruption.

Somali people have not known peace or stability in decades. They live in the middle of a warzone and see members of their family die every day. Somali children are taken from their parents and recruited by terrorist organizations every day. Tens of thousands of Somalis have died during the last decades. The causes of their deaths vary from starvation to being shot while walking down the street. The situation in Somalia is not just a political or economical issue. It is a humanitarian crisis, and it needs to be resolved immediately.

DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Terrorism

According to Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) on "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts", terrorism is defined as follows: "...criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences

within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.”¹

Sharia Law

Sharia isn’t “law” in the sense that we in the West understand it. And most devout Muslims who embrace sharia conceptually don’t think of it as a substitute for civil law. Sharia is not a book of statutes or judicial precedent imposed by a government, and it’s not a set of regulations adjudicated in court. Rather, it is a body of Koran-based guidance that points Muslims toward living an Islamic life. It doesn’t come from the state, and it doesn’t even come in one book or a single collection of rules. Sharia is divine and philosophical. The human interpretation of sharia is called “fiqh,” or Islamic rules of right action, created by individual scholars based on the Koran and hadith (stories of the prophet Muhammad’s life). Fiqh literally means “understanding” — and its many different schools of thought illustrate that scholars knew they didn’t speak for God. Fiqh distinguishes between the spiritual value of an action (how God sees it) and the worldly value of that action (how it affects others). Fiqh rules might obligate a devout Muslim to pray, but it’s not the job of a Muslim ruler to enforce that obligation. Fiqh is not designed to help governments police morality in the way, say, Saudi Arabia does today. According to classical fiqh scholarship, a Muslim ruler’s task was to put forth another type of law, called *siyasa*, based on what best serves the public good. In other words, sharia doesn’t hold that everything objectionable to Islam should be outlawed.²

Civil War

Civil war, a violent conflict between a state and one or more organized non-state actors in the state’s territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or cohesive group, including genocides, and similar violence by non-state actors, such as terrorism or violent crime. The definition of civil war clearly encompasses many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which

¹ <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-4/key-issues/defining-terrorism.html>
<https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/n0454282.pdf>

² https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-sharia/2016/06/24/7e3efb7a-31ef-11e6-8758-d58e76e11b12_story.html

insurgents seek territorial secession or autonomy and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in military coups, or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between ethnic civil wars, in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. Colonial conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.³

Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab is the deadliest jihadi group in sub-Saharan Africa, largely operating in Somalia but known for brutal attacks on neighbouring Kenya. Founded in 2006, the group – whose name translates from Arabic as the “The Youth” or “Mujahideen Youth Movement” – began as the militant arm of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an alliance of hard-line Sharia courts in southern Somalia who sought to rival the Transitional Federal Parliament for control of the country.

Al-Shabaab has long since spun off from the ICU and aims to overthrow the Western-backed successor Federal Parliament on its own, carrying out vicious suicide bombing attacks and other acts of brutality against “enemies of Islam” among the Horn of Africa's Christian and Sufi Muslim population. Committed to ultra-conservative Wahhabi Islam, al-Shabaab intends to run Somalia in accordance with strict extremist principles.

Al-Shabaab initially won popular support by pledging to bring security to a nation that has not had a stable government in 20 years, before losing face when its rejection of international aid made tough conditions worse for their people when the land was struck by drought and famine in 2011.

Al-Shabaab was driven out of Mogadishu that same year by troops from the African Union – a military alliance comprised of soldiers from Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Burundi – and out of the port city of Kismayo in 2012, a huge blow since its cut from the charcoal trade through the docks had been a key source of income.

³ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war>

The group has been affiliated with al-Qaeda since 2012 when its previous leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, pledged “obedience” to his counterpart Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2012. Godane was subsequently killed in a US drone strike and al-Shabaab is now led by Ahmad Umar, also known as Abu Ubaidah. He has between 7,000 and 9,000 foot soldiers at his command. The militia is also thought to have ties to al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram in Algeria and Nigeria respectively.

Al-Shabaab does not have links with Isis, however, having rejected them, a decision that caused a rift among its ranks and led to the formation of a splinter faction, Jabha East Africa, which recognises Isis leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as the “rightful Khalifa of all Muslims”. Having brought carnage to the region over the last decade, al-Shabaab is now recognised as a terrorist organisation by the UK, the US, Norway, Australia, New Zealand and the UAE.

One of its earliest atrocities was the bombing of a restaurant in Kampala, Uganda, on 11 July 2010, designed to coincide with the Fifa World Cup Final between Spain and the Netherlands, revenge for Uganda’s operations against it as part of the African Union. Seventy-four people were killed watching the game that night.

Unquestionably its worst attack was the suicide truck bombing it carried out outside Mogadishu’s Safari Hotel on 14 October 2017, the most devastating in Somalia’s history, which destroyed several nearby blocks and left 587 people dead and 316 injured among the rubble.⁴

Al Qaeda

Al-Qaeda, Arabic al-Qā’idah (“the Base”), broad-based militant Islamist organization founded by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s. Al-Qaeda began as a logistical network to support Muslims fighting against the Soviet Union during the Afghan War; members were recruited throughout the Islamic world. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the organization dispersed but continued to oppose what its leaders considered corrupt Islamic regimes and foreign (i.e., U.S.) presence in Islamic lands. Based in Sudan for a period in the early 1990s, the group eventually re-established its headquarters in Afghanistan (c. 1996) under the patronage of the Taliban militia.

Al-Qaeda merged with a number of other militant Islamist organizations, including Egypt’s Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group, and on several occasions its leaders declared holy war against the United States. The organization established camps for Muslim militants from

⁴ <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/al-shabaab-who-africa-terror-group-jihadi-group-somalia-islamist-a8728921.html>

throughout the world, training tens of thousands in paramilitary skills, and its agents engaged in numerous terrorist attacks, including the destruction of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (1998), and a suicide bomb attack against the U.S. warship Cole in Aden, Yemen (2000; see USS Cole attack). In 2001, 19 militants associated with al-Qaeda staged the September 11 attacks against the United States. Within weeks the U.S. government responded by attacking Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. Thousands of militants were killed or captured, among them several key members (including the militant who allegedly planned and organized the September 11 attacks), and the remainder and their leaders were driven into hiding.

The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 challenged that country's viability as an al-Qaeda sanctuary and training ground and compromised communication, operational, and financial linkages between al-Qaeda leadership and its militants. Rather than significantly weakening al-Qaeda, however, these realities prompted a structural evolution and the growth of "franchising." Increasingly, attacks were orchestrated not only from above by the centralized leadership (after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, based in the Afghan-Pakistani border regions) but also by the localized, relatively autonomous cells it encouraged. Such grassroots independent groups—coalesced locally around a common agenda but subscribing to the al-Qaeda name and its broader ideology—thus meant a diffuse form of militancy, and one far more difficult to confront.

With this organizational shift, al-Qaeda was linked—whether directly or indirectly—to more attacks in the six years following September 11 than it had been in the six years prior, including attacks in Jordan, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Israel, Algeria, and elsewhere. At the same time, al-Qaeda increasingly utilized the Internet as an expansive venue for communication and recruitment and as a mouthpiece for video messages, broadcasts, and propaganda. Meanwhile, some observers expressed concern that U.S. strategy—centred primarily on attempts to overwhelm al-Qaeda militarily—was ineffectual, and at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, al-Qaeda was thought to have reached its greatest strength since the attacks of September 2001.

On May 2, 2011, bin Laden was killed by U.S. military forces after U.S. intelligence located him residing in a secure compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, 31 miles (50 km) from Islamabad. The operation was carried out by a small team that reached the compound in Abbottabad by helicopter. After bin Laden's death was confirmed, it was announced by U.S. Pres. Barack Obama, who hailed the operation as a major success in the fight against al-

Qaeda. On June 16, 2011, al-Qaeda released a statement announcing that Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's long-serving deputy, had been appointed to replace bin Laden as the organization's leader.⁵



The Twin Towers in New York City during Al-Qaeda's terrorist attack on September 11 2001

Warlord

A warlord is an military official, who controls a region within a country with no central government or in a country where the government does not have the power to enforce its control. Warlord are often found in power during civil wars, where nations are divided and there is no lawful government.

Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)

According to www.ngo.org "A non-governmental organization (NGO) is any non-profit, voluntary citizens' group which is organized on a local, national or international level. Task-oriented and driven by people with a common interest, NGOs perform a variety of service and humanitarian functions, bring citizen concerns to Governments, advocate and monitor policies and encourage political participation through provision of information. Some are organized around specific issues, such as human rights, environment or health. They provide analysis and expertise, serve as

⁵ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/al-Qaeda> . For a quite detailed history and a timeline of Al-Qaeda and its operations, you can visit this link:
<https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-qaeda>

early warning mechanisms and help monitor and implement international agreements. Their relationship with offices and agencies of the United Nations system differs depending on their goals, their venue and the mandate of a particular institution.”⁶

Maritime piracy.

According to Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), maritime piracy is defined as any of the following acts:

a. any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

i. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

ii. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

b. any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge

of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

c. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)⁷

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

In 1960, Somalia declared its independence. Only 9 years later, Muhammad Siad Barre rose to power. One year later, he declared Somalia a socialist state. His declaration was followed by the nationalization of Somali economy. During his dictatorship, Somalia received economic assistance from the Soviet Union and Western nations. It was during that time that clans gained more power and the Somali people was divided. In 1984, a group called Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) was formed in Somalia. The group’s goal was to establish an Islamic state the country. Soon, overthrowing Siad Barre became the group’s main focus. At the same time similar groups started to form. Small armed groups came together to fight the

⁶ <http://www.ngo.org/ngoinfo/define.html>

⁷ https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

dictator, in a coalition called Somali National Movement (SNM). AIAI with the help of smaller local groups as well as the SNM succeeded in ousting Muhammad Siad Barre in 1991.

After the fall of Siad Barre, war between clans started to fight each other. In 1992, US-UN forces entered Somalia under the name “UN Interagency Task Force (UNITF)” hoping to restore peace and order and help create a new government. The clans and armed groups tried to fight the foreign forces, resulting to the deaths of hundreds of citizens. In the following years, conflict in Somalia had reached extremes with the civil war and the war against UNITF (which was by now named UNOSOM) resulting to thousands of deaths of citizens, especially vulnerable groups. In the late 1990’s humanitarian relief groups, mostly NGO’s tried to enter Somalia in order to distribute food and other supplies, but foreign citizens were often kidnapped, hurt or killed by the clans’ fighters. UNOSOM’s protection was deemed insufficient by the organizations, and humanitarian assistance in Somalia was significantly reduced.

Islamic Courts Union

The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was a legal and political organization founded by Muslim clerics from the Abgal subclan of the powerful Hawiye clan that operated from 2000 to 2006 in Mogadishu. These Islamic courts adjudicated personal status and criminal law matters according to Islamic law (shari’a). Because they were backed by clan-based ICU militias, they were extremely effective in maintaining order. Abgal clerics did not start the courts in a desire because they promoted Islamism, but rather because they hoped the courts would address the lawlessness that had become endemic in the wake of the 1991 civil war.

Technically speaking, the courts were not overseen by Islamic scholars, nor did they adhere to one particular school of Sunni Islamic law. Rather, they were an extension of Abgal Hawiye clan power, were enforced by clan militias, and received support from clan members. Because these courts were clan-based, they came up against other Hawiye sub-clans, including the Habr Gedir, that of the powerful former military commander and post-civil war warlord General Muhammad Aideed, whose forces controlled parts of Mogadishu. Aideed’s death in 1996 allowed for the formation of new courts, including those sponsored by the Habr Gedir. Other subclans sponsored their own courts. As courts spread, they became more tied to political Islam and less directed by clan politics, especially when al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (“The Islamic Union,” IU) became involved.

The IU was an Islamist organization not based on clan power. Its leaders were from different clans, and included Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. In 1996, a struggling IU fled to Mogadishu

after seeing combat against Gen. Aideed and others elsewhere in the country, and joined in the Islamic court effort. In 2000, these disparate but related courts officially formed the Islamic Courts Union, an umbrella organization, with Sheikh Aweys wielding significant control over the group.

By 2006, the ICU represented a major threat to other warlords controlling areas of Mogadishu. Some of these warlords were suspected of aiding American forces in apprehending terrorism suspects, including high-status figures in local religious circles. At the same time, a new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) had just taken power and its members were being targeted by a wave of assassinations that implicated an emergent militia calling itself al-Shabaab. Warlords grouped together to form the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), appealed to the United States, and framed the ICU as a terrorist organization seeking to establish an Islamic state. In the post-9/11 context of the global war on terror, the George W. Bush administration was particularly keen to address terrorism issues in perceived hotspots such as Somalia. These factors forced the ICU to take an increasingly political stance.

The US-backed ARPCT came into armed conflict with the ICU, which ICU militias won. By June 2006, the ICU had control of nearly all of Mogadishu and the warlords had fled. A remarkable transformation took place in the embattled capital; peace and security were restored, roadblocks removed, trash was cleared, and the air and seaports reopened. New courts were established to address land disputes, reflecting practical approaches to dealing with a crumbled but not hopeless infrastructure. The ICU received widespread support from Mogadishu's citizens.

As an umbrella organization, the ICU managed to bring together a broad spectrum of religious groups, from moderate to radical Islamists. Al-Shabaab was one of the more radical groups affiliated with the ICU. Different perspectives among ICU leaders led to competing visions of how the ICU should move forward.

Sheikh Aweys, who represented a more radical faction within the ICU, was emboldened by the group's successes. He and others began promoting an Islamic state alternative to the TFG, took a critical nationalist stance to Ethiopian involvement in Somalia, and indicated a renewed desire to retake the Ogaden. This alarmed Ethiopian leadership, which was an important backer of the TFG. A third external factor was Ethiopia's neighbor Eritrea, which had broken from Ethiopia in 1991 and supported the ICU. Lastly, the United States was concerned that Somalia was becoming a haven for al-Qaeda militants with support from the

ICU. This complex political dynamic led to the Ethiopian and American decision to eliminate the threat of the ICU, and to UN resolution 1725, authorizing African Union forces (UNISOM) to deploy. These pressures empowered the most radical factions within the ICU, but its militias were no match for the powerful Ethiopian and UNISOM forces. By December the ICU had lost Mogadishu, and chaos and a refugee crisis soon followed. ICU leadership split apart with more moderate elements resettling in Yemen and Kenya. In Somalia, al-Shabaab emerged as the most powerful splinter group from the ICU. Unfettered by ICU oversight, it initiated a campaign that eventually took control of most of southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, and in 2010 formed an alliance with al-Qaeda.⁸



Map of the Horn of Africa and its surrounding countries

MAJOR COUNTRIES AND ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED

United States of America

In 1993, the United States decided to step in the situation in Somalia and end the civil war. After a number of American soldiers was injured or killed in the conflict the US decided to abandon their mission in Somalia. In 2006, Ethiopia decided to enter Somalia and take down the ICU. Their attempt was endorsed by the US, and they received funding and help to train soldiers. In 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a peacekeeping mission in

⁸ <https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/islamic-courts-union>. For a detailed history, timeline, and analysis of ICU and its operations, you can visit this link: <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-courts-union>

Somalia was approved by the UN. The US continued to provide funding and training to the peacekeepers and also contributed to the mission through frequent air strikes. In 2017, president Donald Trump announced that Us troops would return to Somalia to help the new government take down Al-Shabaab.

African Union (AU)

In 2007, the UN approved the operation of an African Union peacekeeping mission in Somali (AMISOM). Prior to that Kenya and Ethiopia, both neighboring countries to Somalia had been affected by the Somali civil war, and had responded to Al-Shabaab attacks with military assistance to the transitional governments the UN had appointed to the country. Since the founding of AMISOM, AU forces have managed to contain the terrorist group and restore peace in parts of the Somalia, even though attacks on citizens are still frequent in the South of the country.



The official logo of AMISOM

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

Date	Description of Event
1960	Somalia declares its independence .
1969	Muhammad Siad Barre rises to power, establishing a dictatorship in Somalia.
1991	Muhammad Siad Barre is overthrown.
2001	The ICU gains power and government role

2005	Somali maritime piracy strikes begin
2006	Al-Shabaab leaves the ICU and starts to attack foreigners
2007	AMISOM starts operating in Somalia
2017	Somalia has its first election after the Siad Barre dictatorship Donald Trump announces military intervention in Somalia

UN INVOLVEMENT: RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, TREATIES AND EVENTS

Previous Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/2102 Adopted on 2 May 2013 (Read the resolution: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2102>)
- S/RES/2158 Adopted on 29 May 2014 (Read the resolution: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2158>)
- S/RES/2221 Adopted on 26 May 2015 (Read the resolution: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2221>)
- S/RES/2232 Adopted on 28 July 2015 (Read the resolution: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2232>)
- S/RES/2275 Adopted on 24 March 2016 (Read the resolution: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2275>)
- S/RES/2358 Adopted on 15 June 2017 (Read the resolution: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2358>)

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE ISSUE

As mentioned in previous parts of this study guide, there have been many efforts to tackle the problems in Somalia, most of which have been initiated or approved by the UN. Ever since the downfall of Siad Barre in 1991, the UN has not stopped attempting to send humanitarian aid to Somalia. In 1992, the Secretary General of the UN decided to appoint an unarmed peacekeeping team in Somalia, that was supposed to facilitate the ceasefire. It was soon clear that such a team was not strong enough to contain the Somali conflict. That same year, a larger group of now armed peacekeepers was assigned to Somalia with the purpose

of protecting Humanitarian Relief NGOs. This operation was named Unified Task Force (UNITAF) or United Nations Operation Somalia (UNOSOM). It was equally monitored by the UN and the USA. UNITAF stopped operating after the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia in 1993.

After the US had left Somalia, the Secretary General and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided to continue operating in Somalia, through the formation of UNOSOM II, which was made up mostly by African nations. At the time of its establishment, UNOSOM II employed approximately 28.000 people(20.000 soldiers + 8.000 other personnel). In the next years, 157 UN peacekeepers died in combat. UNOSOM II withdrew from Somalia in 1995, not having achieved its goal.

In 2007, African Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) was established. It was approved by the UNSC, and originally operated with a six month mandate. AMISOM is still active in Somalia and has managed to fight Al-Shabaab off the capital Mogadishu and largely populated areas. The UN has renewed AMISOM's mandate every year since its establishment.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The situation in Somalia has been an issue for decades, but a solution is yet to be found. Fighting Al-Shabaab and stabilizing the country is extremely difficult due to the fact that Somali citizens are in constant danger and collateral damage is an issue all operations in the country face. Any plan of attack will put innocent people in danger. Economically developed nations must however intervene in order for Somalis to enjoy long lasting peace and security.

Even though military assistance is essential in order to fight Al-Shabaab, it is also important to help Somalis. Humanitarian assistance missions must find a way to enter the country safely and deliver food to the starving population.

With a functioning government in place, it is also time for nations to invest in Somalia and boost the economy. The UN must also try to enhance education in Somalia, in order for children to be harder to recruit by terrorist groups. Education against Al-Shabaab's religious propaganda is essential, in order to avoid the group expanding in the following years.

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[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/635590/EPRS_IDA\(2019\)6355_90_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/635590/EPRS_IDA(2019)6355_90_EN.pdf)

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FURTHER READING MATERIAL FOR DELEGATES

<http://amisom-au.org/>

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-sharia/2016/06/24/7e3efb7a-31ef-11e6-8758-d58e76e11b12_story.html

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[https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2275\(2016\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2275(2016))

[https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2232\(2015\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2232(2015))

[https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2221\(2015\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2221(2015))

[https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2158\(2014\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2158(2014))