Forum: Security Council

Topic: The issue in Caucasus region & Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute (Armenia vs. Azerbaijan)

Expert Chair: Christos Tsitsiridakis

Important note from the chairs' team

In order for the chairs to fully understand the dynamics of the committee, discovering any

misunderstanding prior to the debate and for the better preparation of the delegates you are

asked to proceed as indicated below; 1) Conduct your chairs via email and informing them

about your mun experience so that they can know what exactly to expect of you.

2) Prepare and send your chairs by 11:59 of the 6th of November one position papers for each

of the topics you are going to discuss during the conference. You can contact the expert chair of

each topic for further information concerning your country's policy if needed, and for general

guidance when it comes to your position papers (word limit structure etc). You are going to

receive general comments during the lobbying for your position papers as well as personal

feedback and grades for your papers. The points you will receive will add up to your general

score which is one of the factors that determine the best delegate award. If you for any reason

fail to send your papers before the final deadline you will not be eligible for any award.

Find your expert chair for this topic at tsitsirid@gmail.com .


INTRODUCTION

Dear Delegates,

My name is Christos Tsitsiridakis and I will be the Deputy President of the 5th ATS Security Council. You could contact me for any concerns about the topic we will discuss in tsitsirid@gmail.com. Our topic of debate is the ongoing dispute between the neighboring countries Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding the autonomous region of Nagorno Karabakh. It is a dispute with deep geopolitical and cultural roots that has already cost almost a million lives, a full scale war between two European countries with a geopolitical position of major significance, the violation of self-determination rights of the Nagorno Karabakh people, threats and efforts for systematic genocide, the prosecution of hundreds of thousands Armenians in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis in Armenia, but most importantly the involvement of foreign super(and nuclear)powers separated in groups. All the aforementioned consists a threat to the global security and is up to you delegates to form alliances, finding a ground of common agreement, and propose a resolution that will provide a long-term solution.

This Study Guide is an effort to analyze in the simplest way a perplexed matter of global Security and most importantly to explain the approach that I believe you should follow in your preparation before the conference. So this Study Guide consists only the beginning of your research. You should follow the links that I have gathered in the Bibliography in order to be sure that you really understand the matter and the problems you are going to solve. After that you should really try to figure out your country's policy and prepare closes according to it. I will try to describe the policies of the major countries that are involved, and I am here to answer all your questions.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND



The ongoing dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan has a long history with deep social, cultural and religious roots. The Nagorno Karabakh dispute is a territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno Karabakh and seven more surrounding territories that are controlled from the self-declared Republic of Artakh, but are officially recognized as a de jure* part of Azerbaijan.

The conflict began during the era of the Soviet regime when Joseph Stalin, the Secretary General of the Communist Party in the USSR, decided to make Nagorno Karabakh - historically Armenian and with a majority of Armenian population- an autonomous oblast of Azerbaijan. In the 1920's, the Soviet government established the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region—where 95 percent of the population is ethnically Armenian—within Azerbaijan. Under Bolshevik rule, fighting between the two countries was kept in check, but as the Soviet Union began to collapse, so did its grip on Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh legislature passed a resolution to join Armenia despite the region's legal location within Azerbaijan's borders. In 1988 the Karabakh Armenians demanded the region to be transferred in the Soviet Armenia; the dispute escalated with the collapse of the Union to a full scale war.

As the Soviet Union was dissolving in 1991, the autonomous region officially declared independence. War erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region, leaving roughly 30,000 casualties and hundreds of thousands of refugees. By 1993, Armenia controlled Nagorno-Karabakh and occupied 20 percent of the surrounding Azerbaijani territory. In 1994, Russia brokered a ceasefire which has remained in place since.

Nagorno-Karabakh has been a frozen conflict for more than a decade, but tensions have remained high since a breakdown in talks that followed the April 2016 violence, with repeated ceasefire violations. Negotiation and mediation efforts, primarily led by the Minsk

Group, have failed to produce a permanent solution to the conflict. The Minsk Group was created in 1994 to address the dispute and is co-chaired by the United States, Russia, and France. The co-chairs organize summits between the leaders of the two countries and hold individual meetings. The group has successfully negotiated cease-fires, but the territorial issues remain as intractable as ever. Because Azerbaijani and ethnic Armenian military forces are positioned close to each other and have little to no communication, there is a high risk that inadvertent military action could lead to an escalation of the conflict. The two sides also have domestic political interests that could cause their respective leaders to launch an attack.¹

(1*describes practices that are legally recognized, regardless whether the practice exists in reality. In contrast, de facto ("in fact") describes situations that exist in reality, even if not legally recognized)

A cease fire signed in 1994 provided the nations with a two decade peace until 2016 when a four day escalation consisted the worst fighting to date the cease fire, with the relationships of the two countries to be undermined and the prospect of an escalated war to be more present that ever. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the tension between the two nations are increased and since 2017 an uncompromising and hostile climate has been cultivated in the minds of the people. IN 1988 a referendum for the inclusion of Nagorno in Armenia was held and the outcome was positive, since the Azerbaijanis boycotted it. The peaceful movement that followed turned out during the dissolution of the USSR to a full scale war between the two nations.

THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 1988-994

Full-scale fighting erupted in the late winter of 1992. International mediation by several groups, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), failed to bring resolution. In the spring of 1993, Armenian forces captured territory outside the enclave itself, threatening to catalyze the involvement of other countries in the region. By the end of the war in 1994, the Armenians were in full control of most of the enclave and also held and currently control approximately 9% of Azerbaijan's territory outside the enclave. As many as 230,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 800,000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia and Karabakh have been displaced as a result of the conflict .Ceasefire was signed in May 1994.

Mardakert skirmishes and border clashes

The 2008 Mardakert skirmishes began on March 4, erupted after protest about Armenian elections and consist of the heaviest fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces since the 1994 war. Armenian sources accused Azerbaijan of trying to take advantage of ongoing unrest in Armenia. Azerbaijani sources blamed Armenia, claiming that the Armenian government was trying to divert attention from internal tensions in Armenia. The conflict was terminated after UN involvement.

¹ https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict. Follow the link on Global Conflict Tracker for a very detailed history, timeline, and latest updates.

The February 2010 Nagorno-Karabakh skirmish was an exchange of gunfire ended with three Armenian soldiers Killed and one wounded. In border classes lasted from April of 2011 till 2013 35 Armenian and 34 Azerbaijani soldiers were killed.

By August 5, 2014 the fighting that started on 27 July had left 14 Azerbaijani and 5 Armenian soldiers dead. Overall, 27 Azerbaijani soldiers had died since the start of the year in border clashes. On November 12, 2014, the Azerbaijani armed forces shot down a Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army Mil Mi-24 helicopter over Karabakh's Agdam district. Three servicemen were killed in the incident. Armenian government stated that the helicopter was unarmed, on the contrary the Azerbaijani side stated that the helicopter was trying to attack military thesis. In 2015, 42 Armenian soldiers and 5 civilians were killed as border clashes continued. In addition, at least 64 Azerbaijani soldiers also died.

Between the 1st and the 5th of April 2016, heavy fighting along the Nagorno-Karabakh frontline left 88 Armenian and 31–92 Azerbaijani soldiers dead. One Armenian and three Azerbaijani soldiers were also missing. In addition, 10 civilians (six Azerbaijani and four Armenian) were killed. During the clashes, an Azerbaijani military helicopter and 13 unmanned drones were shot down and an Azerbaijani tank was destroyed, with Baku investing 3 billion on arsenal, more than the entire Armenian budget of that year.

Sporadic major incidents were reported during the fall of 2018, involving border clashes and sniper assassinations of soldiers of both sides. Although no exact casualty figures exist, by 2009, as many as 3,000 people, mostly soldiers, had been killed, according to most observers

FATALITIES

| Year | Armenia | Azerbaijan | |
|------|-----------------|-----------------|--|
| 2010 | 7 soldiers | 18 soldiers | |
| 2011 | 10 soldiers | 4+ soldiers | |
| 2012 | 14 soldiers | 20 soldiers | |
| 2013 | 7 soldiers | 12 soldiers | |
| 2014 | 27 soldiers, 6 | 37 soldiers, 2 | |
| | civilians | civilians | |
| 2015 | 42 soldiers, 5 | 64 soldiers | |
| | civilians | | |
| 2016 | 107 soldiers, 5 | 101 soldiers, 7 | |
| | civilians | civilians | |

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Nagorno-Karabakhhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian%E2%80%93Azerbaijani_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenia%E2%80%93Azerbaijan_relations

MAJOR POWERS INVOLVED

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The strongest and most dedicated ally of Armenia in the region is culturally religiously and politically connected with the Caucasian nation offering from time to time, influence weaponry and even operating forces. As a permanent Security Council member a military superpower Russia's position is a game changing factor. A supporter of the Arataki republic with a constant imperialistic policy of interfering in the post-Soviet states, the Kremlin doesn't really wish for a permanent solution to the problem. The instability allows the constant interference of Moscow. Moreover the present cooperation with the Turkish government, the main supporter of Azerbaijan, may neutralize the firm philo-Armenian position of Russia to a more moderate position. The independence of Nagorno might be a prospect very promising for the Kremlin. The independence of a small republic in the sphere of Russian influence could create the crisis in the national identity of the Caucasians that will allow the prospect of a new big Russian Union again. The fact the Russia is the armament supply for both nations complicates the issue.

According to Sergey Markedonov (ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, RUSSIAN STATE UNIVERSITY FOR THE HUMANITIES):

"For Russia, the tenuous political situation in the South Caucasus has been pushed out of the foreign policy agenda by the crises in Syria and eastern Ukraine. However, this region in general and the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in particular maintain strategic importance for Moscow. This is due to three basic factors.

First, unlike other conflicts in the former USSR and in the Balkans as well, the stances adopted by Russia and the West on the Nagorno-Karabakh confrontation are virtually identical. Today, the three countries that co-chair the Minsk Group continue to acknowledge the updated "Madrid principles" as the basis for a peaceful resolution of the situation, despite all the existing differences around Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Donbass.

The West supports Russia's peace-making activities in Nagorno-Karabakh. Even today, with relations between Moscow and Washington at their lowest point since the USSR dissolution, American diplomats positively assess the role that the Russian leadership played in deescalating the military confrontation and in backing the three-party talks (Moscow-Baku-Yerevan). There is no Russian claim to reconsider interstate borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and no attempt to apply its "revisionist technique" there, while the role of Moscow in reaching the 1994 and 2016 ceasefires is really valued by the US and the EU. At the same time, Russia sees the trilateral format of negotiations as an additional diplomatic playground, not competing or challenging the OSCE Minsk format. The West does not object to it, so the three-party talks can go on, bolstered by the high level of informal trust between President Putin on the one side and the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the other side. In this context, any attempt to diminish Moscow's role would go contrary to the American and European interests because a lot of diplomatic channels would be blocked.

Second, Russia's role in the Nagorno-Karabakh process is fundamentally different from its engagement in the other Eurasian "hot spots". Despite many see Russia as historically close to Armenia, today both parties to the conflict view Moscow as a desired intermediary (that was not the case in either Abkhazia or South Ossetia, at least during the early 2000s). Baku

and Yerevan are interested in developing bilateral relations with Moscow outside the Nagorno-Karabakh context.

Russia considers Armenia as its strategic ally. Both countries share the same integration projects (CSTO/Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union). However, Moscow also values its partnership with Azerbaijan. In 2008, by recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia lost whatever remaining influence it could exert over Georgia. There were fears that it would also lose influence in Azerbaijan, and that explains to some extent Moscow's engagement with Baku. There are also the commercial motivations of selling weapons to Azerbaijan, which, unlike Armenia, pays full price for this weaponry (Armenia can buy Russian weapons at a discount).

Third, Moscow wants to avoid a further escalation in Karabakh, especially along the Armenian-Azerbaijani interstate border. The latter case would oblige the CSTO to intervene military to protect one of its members (Armenia), but key members such as Belarus and Kazakhstan have closer political and economic ties with Azerbaijan. Therefore, in case of any escalation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and especially in case of a resumption of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Astana or Minsk positions may be articulated with utmost precision. Leaning completely in favour of Armenia would also undermine Moscow's ambitions for Russia-led Eurasian projects. Having a military and technical cooperation in place with both South Caucasus countries, Russia tries to ensure a balance of forces, preventing any side to achieve superiority and to undertake a full-scale "unfreezing" of the conflict.

The widespread opinion among Western analysts is that Russia is not interested in the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, aiming instead to preserve its influence on both Baku and Yerevan. This thesis could be adopted, if not for one important detail. True, Moscow is not undertaking its diplomatic efforts in the Karabakh conflict for altruistic reasons. Having lost a significant part of its influence on Georgia, Russia cannot afford to make a hard choice between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On one side of the scale, there will be a military ally and a member in common integration projects; on the other, a neighbouring state and an important economic and political partner.

However, today Baku and Yerevan do not show any signs of reaching a compromise: their maximalist approaches determine their foreign policy, and Karabakh itself in the Armenian and Azerbaijani societies is perceived to some extent as sacred territory. In such circumstances, Moscow is not interested to accept exclusive responsibility and accelerate any solutions, especially due to the difficulty to implement any prospective agreements. In case such agreements failed, this would pose some extra risks to Moscow's reputation and might sour its security environment. According to Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister, the Karabakh problem "can't be solved once and for all in one document". This thesis is extremely important in order to avoid artificial and overstated expectations in the future, as it was on the eve of the Kazan summit in June 2011. If the conflict has not been resolved for many years, and the basic negotiating ideas have already been expressed, it would be naive to believe that one or two forums will provide a positive breakthrough.

Therefore, from the Russian point of view, in the current conditions, the minimization of military incidents (as well as effective monitoring of the Line of Contact) is the main goal today, because it would help to move to the subsequent substantive phases in the negotiations. The peculiarity of Russia-West cooperation on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process and the interests of both Yerevan and Baku in the mediation by Russia can become positive perquisites in this direction."²



² https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/russia-and-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-careful-balancing-19832

THE UNITED STATES

The USA is the superpower that needs to block the expansion of Russia Federation in the weapon markets and political influence zones that was traditionally considered American. Thus the recent Turkey-Russia cooperation finds the leader power of NATO in a complex situation. It seems unlikely for the USA to take Armenia away from the Russian interference, however the effort of European Nations to approach the Armenians (recognition of the Armenian genocide from France for example) gives the opportunity to the USA to find ground for putting pressure to Turkey by approaching the "greatest" enemy of the most important Turkish ally Azerbaijan. The scenario of an independent Nagorno Karabakh is not at all contradicting with the American policies. Also the relationships with Pakistan traditional supporter of Azerbaijan has an effect in the USA position.

According to the Office of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic website:

"Since the early days of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, the United States has been actively engaged in the effort to put an end to fighting and facilitate a resolution of the conflict. In 1989, the U.S. Senate passed, a resolution highlighting America's support for the fundamental rights and the aspirations of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh generally, and for a peaceful and fair settlement to the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh specifically (S.J. Res. 178).

The United States is also actively involved in the conflict mediation and settlement process. Along with Russia and France, the USA co-chaired the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Since 1992, it is a main vehicle for the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict that has sought to mediate a durable peace settlement. The Group has been coming forward with a series of proposals to solve the crisis, but subsequent talks still do not result in a final peace agreement.

The U.S. Congress has also addressed the Karabakh conflict through the annual foreign operations appropriations process. In 1992, Congress restricted U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan (known as the Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act), over Azerbaijan's brutal military campaign against Nagorno Karabakh. After allowing for a national security waiver of this provision in 2001, Congress insisted that any security-related assistance to Azerbaijan must not be used against Armenians. Since then members of Congress has worked to maintain a balance in security assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan. In addition, the U.S. Congress repeatedly appropriated funds for confidence-building measures in the Caucasus, particularly in view to settle the Karabakh conflict.

Similarly, Members of the Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues continue to circulate numerous "Dear Colleague" letters and deliver speeches on the House and Senate floors in which they reaffirm their support for a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. These Members also praise the determination of the Karabakh people to maintain their independence.

The people and the government of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic are grateful to the United States for its efforts on Nagorno Karabakh issue. Moreover, our government shares

the desire of the USA to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict through the OSCE peace process, since we believe that a peaceful and economically integrated South Caucasus will bring stability, economic prosperity and increased opportunity for all peoples of the region."



THE EUROPEAN UNION

The tension of the relationships of Turkey and the leading members of the European Union France and United Kingdom are a major factor for the position of the Union towards the issue. France devoted recently a day in the memory the victims of the Armenian genocide under the communicational explosion of Turkish officials. Germany is the member in the most perplexed position, since the Turkish and Azerbaijani minors are vital member of Germany's working class. The European States, at least according to their constitutions, are the stronger supporters of the right of self-determination of people, thus supporters of the right of the Armenian Nagorno majority to decide the status of the region after a legitimate referendum. However the ethicist-regionalism tension in European States as France, Spain, UK etc. has undermined the respect and tolerance for the expression of different national identities within a polytechnic state.

³ http://www.nkrusa.org/nk conflict/us response.shtml



TIMELINE OF EVENTS

| 20 February 1988 | Independence referendum in Nagorno | |
|------------------|---|--|
| 1980-1991 | Collapse of the USSR | |
| 1988-1994 | The Nagorno Karabakh war | |
| 1994 | Cease fire treaty | |
| 2010 | Mardakert skirmishes | |
| 2014 | clashes and helicopter shootdown | |
| 2016 | Four-Day War | |
| | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016 Nagorno- | |
| | Karabakh clashes | |
| 2016-present | Renewed border clashes | |

PREVIOUS UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT

1993 (April- November)

Four UN Security Council Resolutions have been passed during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

| NO. | Purpose | Date |
|-----|-------------------------------|----------------|
| 822 | Calls for the cessation of | April 30, 1993 |
| | hostilities and withdrawal of | |
| | Armenian troops from | |
| | Kelbajar and other recently | |
| | occupied areas of the | |
| | Azerbaijani Republic | |

| | following its occupation on April 3, 1993. | |
|-----|---|-------------------|
| 853 | Demands the immediate cessation of all hostilities, calls on withdrawal of Armenian troops from Agdam and other recently occupied areas of the Azerbaijani Republic and reaffirms UN Resolution 822. | July 29, 1993 |
| 874 | Calls for the preservation of the ceasefire, cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Armenian troops from recently occupied Azerbaijani districts of Fizuli (August 23, 1993), Jabrayil (August 26, 1993), Qubadli (September 31, 1993) and other recently occupied areas of the Azerbaijani Republic, and reaffirms UN Resolutions 822 and 853. | October 14, 1993 |
| 884 | Condemns the recent violations of the cease-fire established between the parties, which resulted in a resumption of hostilities; calls upon the Government of Armenia to use its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic with resolutions 822, 853 and 874; demands from the parties concerned the immediate cessation of armed hostilities; calls for the withdrawal of Armenia from Azerbaijani district of Zangilan and reaffirms UN | November 12, 1993 |
| | Resolutions 822, 853, 874. | |

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of United Nations Security Council resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Resolution 62/243

Following the incident, on March 14 2008 the United Nations General Assembly by a recorded vote of 39 in favor to 7 against adopted Resolution 62/243 titled "The Situation in

the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan", demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The resolution reaffirmed "continued respect and support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Azerbaijan "within its internationally recognized borders", demanded the "immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all the occupied territories of Azerbaijan", and emphasized that "no state shall render aid or assistance" to maintain the occupation of Azerbaijani territories. France USA and Russia voted against.

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE ISSUE

In 2017, the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents discussed a possible settlement of the conflict over Azerbaijan's breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh at a meeting in Geneva.

Serzh Sarkisian of Armenia and Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliyev held talks on October 16 under the auspices of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

A joint statement issued after the talks by the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers and the co-chairs of the Minsk Group (France, Russia, and the United States) said that "the meeting took place in a constructive atmosphere."

"The presidents agreed to take measures to intensify the negotiation process and to take additional steps to reduce tensions on the Line of Contact," the statement said.

"The co-chairs expressed their satisfaction with these direct talks, which took place after a long interval. They remain ready to work with the sides on mediating a peacefully negotiated settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As a next step, the co-chairs will organize working sessions with the Ministers in the near future," the statement added.

The two presidents also held face-to-face talks, Sarkisan's press secretary Vladimir Hakobian wrote on Twitter.

The talks took place after the meeting of the two presidents, which was also attended by Foreign Ministers Edward Nalbandian (Armenia) and Elmar Mammadyarov (Azerbaijan); the co-chairs of the Minsk Group, Igor Popov of Russia, Stephane Visconti of France, and Andrew Schofer of the United States; as well as the OSCE chairman in office, Andrzej Kasprzyk.

The region of Nagorno-Karabakh, populated mainly by ethnic Armenians, declared independence from Azerbaijan amid a 1988-94 war that killed about 30,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands.

Internationally mediated negotiations with the involvement of the Minsk Group have failed to result in a resolution. At the June 2016 talks in St. Petersburg, Russia, Sarkisian and Aliyev expressed readiness to seek a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The last meeting mediated by the Minsk Group co-chairs took place in Vienna in May 2016. It followed a truce in April that halted four days of fierce fighting in and around Nagorno-

Karabakh between Armenia-backed separatists and Azerbaijan's military. About 75 soldiers from both sides were killed in April, along with several civilians.⁴

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Approaching the end of this Study Guide I will propose to you delegates the solutions that I find more realistic and closer to the policies of the main powers represented. However your creativity and originality of ideas will shape the final resolution of our committee. So I have to remind you that the followings, as all the aforementioned material, is an attempt for guidance that will help you during your research and should not be followed unconditionally and without serious, though, constructive doubt. As a reminder of all these I quote you these words of Friedrich Nietzsche.

"You say now that you believe in Me. But what is the importance of me! You are my believers: But what is the importance of the faithful!

You have not yet search for yourself: Then you found Me. That is what believers do. That's why any faith counts so little. Now I dare you to loose me and to find yourselves. And only when all of you have renounced me, I will desire to return to you."

I believe that the challenge of this year's Security Council, is to propose a final solution that will settle the differences that for decades undermine peace between the two Nations. The first solution that comes to my mind, according the laws of UN and the constitutions of the most of the Member State is the respect of the right of Arataki people to self-determination. Is within the people's power to decide the political status of their homeland. In the case of Nagorno, there is already elected political bodies that with the help and protection of the two States could hold a fair and democratic referendum. The people could choose either their independence, or the amalgamation with Armenia or Azerbaijan. Delegates should keep in mind that based on the outcome of the previous resolution and the dominance of the Armenian element in Nagorno this is a solution in favor of the Armenian interests.

The Security Council could also demand the cease fire and define penalties to the offenders. The creation of a gray zone guarded from peacekeeping forces and the maintenance of the present political situation will realize the tension but will also preserve the conflict, something that serves the superpowers involved, mainly Russia that is the main arsenal supply for both countries.

Finally other long term solutions should be kept in mind. Facilitating the relationships of Armenia and Azerbaijan, compromising the fundamental religious differences with the cooperation of the Islamic International Fora, the reconsideration of the Azerbaijanis' connection with allies unstable towards their commitments (Pakistan Turkey), and opening the doors of the European Union to the two Nations are important steps towards peace and stability. Last but not least, the situation of the minors that moved away because of their ethnicity should be restored.

⁴ https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-talks/28797554.html

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